Colombia: another notch on Obama's belt
Yesterday was a historic day for the Colombian people as its government signed a ceasefire with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). “A Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire, Cessation of Hostilities, and Laying Aside of Weapons” was the fifth and final element of the peace accords to end that country's several decades-long civil war, a war that had left more than 200,000 dead and millions displaced.
The Obama administration has not found much success in its policies towards Central America and Mexico. Trade; immigration; drugs trafficking; corruption; democratic backsliding; and cartel, gang, and organized crime violence. You name it. It's not all Obama's fault but it is hard to say that Mexico and Central America are demonstrably better off than they were eight years ago.
However, I imagine that if you had asked most Latin American specialists what they would have hoped would have been resolved during Obama's four/eight years in office, normalizing relations with Cuba and ending the Colombian civil war would have been one/two. Depending on what happens over the next few years, these two historic events are going to dominate Latin American history books. And while you can't entirely blame Obama for what has occurred in Mexico and Central America, you can't give him full credit for what has transpired in Cuba and Colombia.
I've tried to make this commitment in the past but I am going to try to pay greater attention to the FARC's transition to political party. I'm guessing that they will perform somewhere between the FMLN and URNG, most likely the latter. The FMLN was the region's strongest guerrilla group with quite an impressive political network. They immediately became El Salvador's second largest political party with 25% of the vote. The FMLN soon became the country's largest legislative party, even though the right in coalition outnumbered them, and then won the presidency in 2009.
The URNG, on the other hand, entered the political arena in a much weaker state than the FMLN. They had few combatants and much weaker relations with civil society. In my opinion, the drawn out peace process in Guatemala weakened the URNG. In an alliance with other leftist groups in 1999, however, the URNG/ANN did worse than expected which was a problem of expectations rather than performance. With Alvaro Colom as its candidate, the URNG/ANN captured 12% of the vote and became the country third largest political party, well behind the top two. The URNG is now the second longest running political party in Guatemala, although that is little consolation to its followers. You can check out my academic writing on the FMLN and URNG here. Let me know if you'd like a copy of anything.
So there you have the best and worst case scenarios for the FARC as it begins its transition to political party.
The Obama administration has not found much success in its policies towards Central America and Mexico. Trade; immigration; drugs trafficking; corruption; democratic backsliding; and cartel, gang, and organized crime violence. You name it. It's not all Obama's fault but it is hard to say that Mexico and Central America are demonstrably better off than they were eight years ago.
However, I imagine that if you had asked most Latin American specialists what they would have hoped would have been resolved during Obama's four/eight years in office, normalizing relations with Cuba and ending the Colombian civil war would have been one/two. Depending on what happens over the next few years, these two historic events are going to dominate Latin American history books. And while you can't entirely blame Obama for what has occurred in Mexico and Central America, you can't give him full credit for what has transpired in Cuba and Colombia.
I've tried to make this commitment in the past but I am going to try to pay greater attention to the FARC's transition to political party. I'm guessing that they will perform somewhere between the FMLN and URNG, most likely the latter. The FMLN was the region's strongest guerrilla group with quite an impressive political network. They immediately became El Salvador's second largest political party with 25% of the vote. The FMLN soon became the country's largest legislative party, even though the right in coalition outnumbered them, and then won the presidency in 2009.
The URNG, on the other hand, entered the political arena in a much weaker state than the FMLN. They had few combatants and much weaker relations with civil society. In my opinion, the drawn out peace process in Guatemala weakened the URNG. In an alliance with other leftist groups in 1999, however, the URNG/ANN did worse than expected which was a problem of expectations rather than performance. With Alvaro Colom as its candidate, the URNG/ANN captured 12% of the vote and became the country third largest political party, well behind the top two. The URNG is now the second longest running political party in Guatemala, although that is little consolation to its followers. You can check out my academic writing on the FMLN and URNG here. Let me know if you'd like a copy of anything.
So there you have the best and worst case scenarios for the FARC as it begins its transition to political party.
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