Central America - the FMLN's rearguard
I returned from a two-week trip to El Salvador on Sunday. It was a terrific trip. I interviewed about fifteen people officially on the trip. There were a number of additional conversations with Salvadorans and internacionalistas alike that were informative as well but were not necessarily interviews. The primary focus of my interviews was on the relationship among the Central American revolutionary groups both prior to and following each group's unification. Alberto Martin and I presented a draft of the paper at an AHILA conference in Berlin last year based on interviews we carried out with Guatemalan guerrillas and some FMLN. We hope to have the paper updated and sent out before the end of the year.
There was a lot of interactions among the Central American would be revolutionaries in the 1960s and 1970s, although "a lot" is tough to quantify. The Guatemalan FAR carried out some operations in El Salvador in the 1960s and 1970s. Nicaraguan and Salvadoran guerrillas traveled to Guatemala for training. Guatemalans and Salvadorans joined the final offensive to topple Somoza in Nicaragua. The Salvadorans sent probably somewhere between $5-6 million and up to 200 of their best troops. The Guatemalans sent less than 100 combatientes and, as far as I can tell, no money. Some Sandinistas then returned the favor and fought in the 1981 final offensive in El Salvador, although more of their own accord than a strategic decision of the FSLN.
One of the surprises of the trip was the extent of the FPL and FMLN's activities in Honduras in the 1970s and 1980s. While many said that they had little connections with the small number of Honduran guerrillas because they could not be trusted, too much infiltration, the FPL seems to have developed a relatively extensive relationship with the Cinchoneros and even the Morazanistas. The FPL and FMLN used Honduran territory in the 1970s and 1980s to smuggle people and weapons into El Salvador. They had a network of bodegas along the Honduran border to assist in the smuggling as well as to provide intelligence on military movements in Honduras. They established similar bodegas in Guatemala and Costa Rica. With full knowledge of the authorities, the FMLN used the Costa Rican airport in the middle of the night to ship weapons and supplies into the region. In 1980 and 1981, the FPL was preparing Honduran territory for their military use in case of a US invasion of Central America.
While the FMLN could not have been as successful as they were without the deep support of the Salvadoran people, their sophisticated use of neighboring countries' territory was essential as well. There's a good deal more to share but that's enough for now.
The second area of investigation was to continue laying the groundwork for a paper on US-Salvadoran relations, really US-FMLN relations after the end of the Cold War. Most people I spoke with characterized our relations as quite good. FMLN were quick to point out the extent of their contacts with the US government and people during the 1980s and 1990s. Upon signing the Peace Agreement, a high-level US official told Schafik Handal that the FMLN had signed the treaty not just with ARENA and the Salvadoran government but with the US. We were ready to embark upon a new era of diplomatic relations with them.
There's more I need to learn about the last twenty-plus years, but everyone seemed satisfied with our contacts, describing them as "normal." It's actually pretty remarkable given our 1980s history. The successful relationship between the US and FMLN during the 1990s and 2000s facilitated the US' continued good working relationship with the FMLN under Funes. That's not to say that we don't have our challenges but they are no greater than the US has with other countries in the world. That might not make some people happy but it is what it is.
I hired someone to arrange the interviews that I had hoped to schedule. They did a great job as I secured interviews with Facundo Guardado, Norma Guevara, Francisco Jovel, Gerson Martinez, Medardo Gonzalez, among others. I'd highly recommend as the price was reasonable. Let me know if you'd like his contact information.
There was a lot of interactions among the Central American would be revolutionaries in the 1960s and 1970s, although "a lot" is tough to quantify. The Guatemalan FAR carried out some operations in El Salvador in the 1960s and 1970s. Nicaraguan and Salvadoran guerrillas traveled to Guatemala for training. Guatemalans and Salvadorans joined the final offensive to topple Somoza in Nicaragua. The Salvadorans sent probably somewhere between $5-6 million and up to 200 of their best troops. The Guatemalans sent less than 100 combatientes and, as far as I can tell, no money. Some Sandinistas then returned the favor and fought in the 1981 final offensive in El Salvador, although more of their own accord than a strategic decision of the FSLN.
One of the surprises of the trip was the extent of the FPL and FMLN's activities in Honduras in the 1970s and 1980s. While many said that they had little connections with the small number of Honduran guerrillas because they could not be trusted, too much infiltration, the FPL seems to have developed a relatively extensive relationship with the Cinchoneros and even the Morazanistas. The FPL and FMLN used Honduran territory in the 1970s and 1980s to smuggle people and weapons into El Salvador. They had a network of bodegas along the Honduran border to assist in the smuggling as well as to provide intelligence on military movements in Honduras. They established similar bodegas in Guatemala and Costa Rica. With full knowledge of the authorities, the FMLN used the Costa Rican airport in the middle of the night to ship weapons and supplies into the region. In 1980 and 1981, the FPL was preparing Honduran territory for their military use in case of a US invasion of Central America.
While the FMLN could not have been as successful as they were without the deep support of the Salvadoran people, their sophisticated use of neighboring countries' territory was essential as well. There's a good deal more to share but that's enough for now.
The second area of investigation was to continue laying the groundwork for a paper on US-Salvadoran relations, really US-FMLN relations after the end of the Cold War. Most people I spoke with characterized our relations as quite good. FMLN were quick to point out the extent of their contacts with the US government and people during the 1980s and 1990s. Upon signing the Peace Agreement, a high-level US official told Schafik Handal that the FMLN had signed the treaty not just with ARENA and the Salvadoran government but with the US. We were ready to embark upon a new era of diplomatic relations with them.
There's more I need to learn about the last twenty-plus years, but everyone seemed satisfied with our contacts, describing them as "normal." It's actually pretty remarkable given our 1980s history. The successful relationship between the US and FMLN during the 1990s and 2000s facilitated the US' continued good working relationship with the FMLN under Funes. That's not to say that we don't have our challenges but they are no greater than the US has with other countries in the world. That might not make some people happy but it is what it is.
I hired someone to arrange the interviews that I had hoped to schedule. They did a great job as I secured interviews with Facundo Guardado, Norma Guevara, Francisco Jovel, Gerson Martinez, Medardo Gonzalez, among others. I'd highly recommend as the price was reasonable. Let me know if you'd like his contact information.
Post a Comment