Central American Revolutionary Ties at #APSA2016
Alberto Martin Alvarez and I have been working on a paper that investigates the relationship between the Central American revolutionary groups during the 1960s and 1970s, the Sandinista Revolution and its aftermath, and the postwar periods in each country. We've presented this research before but have updated it to take advantage of interviews that I carried out with members of the FMLN in July 2015. I am presenting the paper on Friday at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia.
As of right now, there's a so what part of the paper missing. While they had contacts throughout the entire time period, it has been difficult to understand how important those ties were. During the 1960s, members of the Rebel Armed Forces traveled the region looking for like-minded revolutionaries. A handful of individuals from through Central and South America traveled to Guatemala for training in guerrilla warfare. Some died fighting there, at least two Salvadorans, while others returned with what they had learned in order to pursue revolution in their own countries. Several Sandinistas returned to Nicaragua with money and training.
The FAR and El Grupo (individuals who would go on to establish the ERP) developed a strong relationship in the 1970s. The FAR was able to use El Salvador as its rearguard. The two carried out some joint bank robberies and killings in El Salvador in the 1970. They also created a joint war-fund but it appears that the ERP spent it without the FAR's knowledge. That wasn't good as it was a time of growth for the Guatemalan insurgency, a time where they really could use the money. Four FPL militants traveled to Guatemala for training with the EGP in 1974 but returned unconvinced that the Guatemalan experience would be helpful for what they were about to engage in.
Dozens of FMLN and URNG (prior to their unification) traveled to Nicaragua to fight in the final offensive, and a few of them died fighting for the Sandinistas. Ideological ties and personal friendships were key to how contacts were made and whether they continued throughout the 1980s. Then there was also the influence of Cuba and some Central American governments. Given US attempts to isolate revolutionary Nicaragua, the Sandinistas wanted the Guatemalan government's political support, trade, and investment, or at least active neutrality. That seems to have limited FSLN - URNG cooperation in the mid- to late-1980s (Cerezo onward, perhaps a bit earlier).
While the three organizations maintained permanent relations during each country's peace process and their participation in postwar politics, their contacts were more of international solidarity and fraternity rather than operational networking. They honestly can't say why other than that the conditions in their countries and the peace processes were so different that collaboration did not make sense. They also did not look at each other as models to emulate. The Guatemalan guerrillas believed that the Nicaraguan experience was so different that it did not make any sense to learn from while the Salvadoran experience provided them with lessons about what not to do.
They were very critical of the commitments in the Salvadoran peace agreement which they believed did not go far enough in solving the problems of that country. They needed reforms that were much deeper in Guatemala. The Guatemalans were also critical of the FMLN's original structure as a political party where each organization maintained its relative independence. The FMLN was a political party of five separate entities. The URNG wanted a single party where it four component parts would fade away.
We hope to get the paper out under review by the end of the year. If you'd like a copy, please send me a message. We'd also be happy to receive some suggestions, especially to sources that comment directly on exchanges among the Central American revolutionary groups. If you are in Philadelphia Wednesday - Sunday, let me know. Maybe we can grab a drink.
We've also broken off a part of the original paper to start a second one that looks at how the FMLN used all of Central America, not just Chaltatenango and Morazan departments, as its rearguard during the 1970s and 1980s. That will be next year.
As of right now, there's a so what part of the paper missing. While they had contacts throughout the entire time period, it has been difficult to understand how important those ties were. During the 1960s, members of the Rebel Armed Forces traveled the region looking for like-minded revolutionaries. A handful of individuals from through Central and South America traveled to Guatemala for training in guerrilla warfare. Some died fighting there, at least two Salvadorans, while others returned with what they had learned in order to pursue revolution in their own countries. Several Sandinistas returned to Nicaragua with money and training.
The FAR and El Grupo (individuals who would go on to establish the ERP) developed a strong relationship in the 1970s. The FAR was able to use El Salvador as its rearguard. The two carried out some joint bank robberies and killings in El Salvador in the 1970. They also created a joint war-fund but it appears that the ERP spent it without the FAR's knowledge. That wasn't good as it was a time of growth for the Guatemalan insurgency, a time where they really could use the money. Four FPL militants traveled to Guatemala for training with the EGP in 1974 but returned unconvinced that the Guatemalan experience would be helpful for what they were about to engage in.
Dozens of FMLN and URNG (prior to their unification) traveled to Nicaragua to fight in the final offensive, and a few of them died fighting for the Sandinistas. Ideological ties and personal friendships were key to how contacts were made and whether they continued throughout the 1980s. Then there was also the influence of Cuba and some Central American governments. Given US attempts to isolate revolutionary Nicaragua, the Sandinistas wanted the Guatemalan government's political support, trade, and investment, or at least active neutrality. That seems to have limited FSLN - URNG cooperation in the mid- to late-1980s (Cerezo onward, perhaps a bit earlier).
While the three organizations maintained permanent relations during each country's peace process and their participation in postwar politics, their contacts were more of international solidarity and fraternity rather than operational networking. They honestly can't say why other than that the conditions in their countries and the peace processes were so different that collaboration did not make sense. They also did not look at each other as models to emulate. The Guatemalan guerrillas believed that the Nicaraguan experience was so different that it did not make any sense to learn from while the Salvadoran experience provided them with lessons about what not to do.
They were very critical of the commitments in the Salvadoran peace agreement which they believed did not go far enough in solving the problems of that country. They needed reforms that were much deeper in Guatemala. The Guatemalans were also critical of the FMLN's original structure as a political party where each organization maintained its relative independence. The FMLN was a political party of five separate entities. The URNG wanted a single party where it four component parts would fade away.
We hope to get the paper out under review by the end of the year. If you'd like a copy, please send me a message. We'd also be happy to receive some suggestions, especially to sources that comment directly on exchanges among the Central American revolutionary groups. If you are in Philadelphia Wednesday - Sunday, let me know. Maybe we can grab a drink.
We've also broken off a part of the original paper to start a second one that looks at how the FMLN used all of Central America, not just Chaltatenango and Morazan departments, as its rearguard during the 1970s and 1980s. That will be next year.
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