Guatemala never recovered from failed referendum
Surprisingly, the Colombian people voted "no" on yesterday's referendum. Pre-referendum day seemed to indicate that the referendum in support of peace would pass by a comfortable margin. However, the Colombian state and FARC will now return to Havana to brainstorm what is next, a question I'm not sure any of them were seriously pondering as of Saturday.
In summer 2014, I traveled to a UNDP conference in Kenya on "The challenge of political transformation of armed and banned groups." I was there to discuss the previous experience of Latin American rebel group transitions to political parties. During the conference, I spoke with several individuals about the Colombian peace process in light of what had previously transpired in Central America.
I thought that the FARC could transition to a political party, although their political success would probably look more like the URNG (optimistic) or Contras (pessimistic) rather than the FMLN and FSLN. They had fifty years of organizing history, a relatively sizable number of combatants, a somewhat favorable institutional environment, and the possibility of building off comprehensive peace agreements. On the negative side, they had a history of violence against civilians, a limited number of noncombatants, and weak ties with civil society.
However, I was worried about the possibility (might have been a reality at the time) of putting the peace agreement to a vote. While I generally support consulting the population about elements of peace agreements, I kept thinking about the 1999 constitutional referendum in Guatemala. While the referendum was not an up/down vote on the peace accords, they did ask for public approval of a series of reforms that had been part of the ten years of negotiations. After a right-wing campaign of fear, less than twenty-percent of the population turned out to vote and a majority of those who did turn out to vote, voted no.
The Guatemalan accords might have accomplished more had they been less ambitious but been approved as part of the government-URNG negotiations and, therefore, not requiring citizen approval. Instead, the reforms failed and the URNG and PAN, who negotiated the peace agreement, were further weakened. The failure to pass the referendum and the time lost on campaigning, undermined the URNG's performance in that year's national elections. In some ways, the URNG (and the country) never recovered.
In summer 2014, I traveled to a UNDP conference in Kenya on "The challenge of political transformation of armed and banned groups." I was there to discuss the previous experience of Latin American rebel group transitions to political parties. During the conference, I spoke with several individuals about the Colombian peace process in light of what had previously transpired in Central America.
I thought that the FARC could transition to a political party, although their political success would probably look more like the URNG (optimistic) or Contras (pessimistic) rather than the FMLN and FSLN. They had fifty years of organizing history, a relatively sizable number of combatants, a somewhat favorable institutional environment, and the possibility of building off comprehensive peace agreements. On the negative side, they had a history of violence against civilians, a limited number of noncombatants, and weak ties with civil society.
However, I was worried about the possibility (might have been a reality at the time) of putting the peace agreement to a vote. While I generally support consulting the population about elements of peace agreements, I kept thinking about the 1999 constitutional referendum in Guatemala. While the referendum was not an up/down vote on the peace accords, they did ask for public approval of a series of reforms that had been part of the ten years of negotiations. After a right-wing campaign of fear, less than twenty-percent of the population turned out to vote and a majority of those who did turn out to vote, voted no.
The Guatemalan accords might have accomplished more had they been less ambitious but been approved as part of the government-URNG negotiations and, therefore, not requiring citizen approval. Instead, the reforms failed and the URNG and PAN, who negotiated the peace agreement, were further weakened. The failure to pass the referendum and the time lost on campaigning, undermined the URNG's performance in that year's national elections. In some ways, the URNG (and the country) never recovered.
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